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Previous research found that country elevators that are the first in their area to grade wheat and pay quality-adjusted 
prices would receive above-normal profits at the expense of their competitors.  Because of spatial monopsony, these 
early-adopting elevators would pass on to producers only 70% of the quality-based price differentials received from 
next-in-line buyers.  If competing elevators also adopted these practices, profits for all elevators would return to near 
normal, and elevators would pass on to producers nearly all price differentials received from next-in-line buyers.  
However, that research could not explain why more elevators were not becoming “early adopters” by paying 
quality-adjusted prices.   
 
More recent research found that producers’ risk aversion and lack of information about the quality of their wheat 
could explain more of the failure of country elevators to pass on premiums and discounts. If producers are risk 
averse, an elevator that imposes discounts for lower quality wheat, even while paying a higher price for high quality 
wheat, risks losing business if producers believe that a competing elevator may be more likely to pay them a higher 
price net of discounts. However, even more important is the level of information producers have about the quality of 
their wheat before selling it to an elevator. Still, these explanations account for only part of elevators’ apparent 
reluctance to pay quality-adjusted prices. 
 
Since inconsistencies have been observed between expected utility and individuals’ behavior, this research considers 
the case where producers’ preferences can be more appropriately modeled by prospect theory, and whether such 
preferences can explain more of elevators’ reluctance to pay quality-adjusted prices. A simulation model is used to 
measure the effects of risk-averse producers (in both expected utility and prospect theory frameworks) and limited 
quality information on profits that can be earned by an elevator that pays quality-adjusted prices.  Results indicate 





As foreign and domestic grain buyers have increased standards for grain quality, next-in-
line (NIL) buyers have begun to charge larger discounts for wheat that does not meet those 
higher standards (Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway).  Passing premiums and discounts on to 
producers should reward producers who respond to those signals and deliver higher quality grain, 
and will facilitate supplying products that meet consumers’ needs. 
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that not all elevators are passing on all or even 
most of those premiums and discounts to producers. Moreover, many county elevators are not 
measuring grain characteristics adequately (Kenkel, Anderson, and Attaway, 1997).  This implies that the marketing system is not adequately transmitting price signals for quality 
characteristics. While extension education programs have motivated some elevator operators to 
grade accurately in order to increase profits, few have begun to pay quality-adjusted prices.  
Work by Elliott et al. (1998) explored two possible explanations for this apparent pricing 
inefficiency.  First, grading wheat accurately costs more in labor time and equipment.  Second, 
the spatial monopsony structure in which many country elevators operate may limit the extent to 
which they find it profitable to pay higher prices for higher quality grain.  
In the work by Elliott et al., these explanations accounted for part, but not all, of the 
smaller quality differentials paid by country elevators than those paid by NIL buyers.  Their 
results indicated that because of spatial monopsony early adopters of grading and quality-based 
pricing practices would pass on to producers only 70% of price differentials received from NIL 
buyers, and receive above-normal profits at the expense of their competitors.  However, if 
competing elevators adopted such practices, profits of all elevators would return to near normal, 
except lower by the cost of grading equipment.  Then all elevators would pass on to producers 
the full amount of price differentials received from NIL buyers, rewarding producers of high 
quality wheat at the expense of producers of low quality wheat.  These results failed to explain 
the apparent reluctance of elevators to be first adopters. 
Adam and Hong examined an additional explanation for country elevators’ failure to pay 
producers quality-adjusted prices. An elevator that imposes discounts for lower quality wheat, 
even while paying a higher price for high quality wheat, risks losing business if producers 
believe that a competing elevator is more likely to pay them a higher price net of discounts.  
Producers likely are uncertain about the quality of their grain before they deliver it to an elevator, 
and thus are uncertain about the net price they will receive.  Risk averse producers would prefer 
a certain price to a quality-adjusted price that is equally likely to be higher (because of a premium) or lower (because of a discount). Also, losing a customer one year increases the 
chances the customer will not sell grain to the elevator in succeeding years.
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  The results, based on an expected utility characterization of producer preferences, 
suggested that the amount of information producers have about the quality of their wheat before 
delivering it to the elevator has a greater effect than degree of risk aversion does.  Still, however, 
the effects of risk aversion and incomplete information accounted for only a portion of elevators’ 
apparent reluctance to pay quality-adjusted prices. 
The work here builds on earlier work by considering an alternative characterization of 
producer risk preferences, prospect theory. Tversky and Kahneman’s model of cumulative 
prospect theory overcomes inconsistencies between expected utility models and empirical 
observation of individuals’ behavior.  In particular, expected utility is inconsistent with: 1) 
framing effects; 2) nonlinear preferences; 3) source-dependence; 4) risk-seeking behavior in 
some circumstances; and 5) loss aversion, the tendency for individuals to be more sensitive to 
reductions than to increases in their levels of well-being.  
Prospect theory hypothesizes that producers dislike discounts more than they like 
premiums of the same magnitude.  Under that hypothesis, producers would have an even greater 
tendency to prefer an average price than quality-adjusted prices.  Under prospect theory, 
                                                            
1 A colleague (Jim Fain, Dept. of Economics, Oklahoma State University) has suggested that this risk effect can also 
be viewed in the context of implicit contract theory.  The theory was introduced by Baily (1974), Gordon (1974), 
and Azariadis (1975) in an attempt to explain the industrial practice of laying off unneeded workers and paying 
unchanged wages to the remaining work force as product demand decreased.  As explained by Azariadis, when 
workers are risk averse and firms are risk neutral, each wage contract offered by the firm must yield a certain level 
of expected utility for workers.  However, workers prefer a contract that offers the same wage across all possible 
states of nature, which gives a wage lower than the expected value of the state contingent wages.  This contract is 
possible because the workers are willing to pay insurance premiums to eliminate uncertainty.  The firms are willing 
to do this because they will get higher expected profits by paying a lower wage with certainty compared to the state 
contingent wage contract. 
This implicit contract concept can be applied to the elevator profit maximization problem.  If farmers are 
risk averse and elevators are risk neutral, then elevators may have an incentive to provide insurance for the farmers 
by paying one price for a range of acceptable qualities of wheat, if the price they pay is lower than the expected 
value of quality-adjusted prices. producers exhibit risk-seeking behavior for outcomes below a specified outcome, and risk-averse 
behavior for outcomes above the specified outcome.   
  To the extent that prospect theory helps explain the effect of producer preferences on 
elevators’ grading practices, producers are making psychological “mistakes”.  One implication of 
this is that educational programs may help producers make decisions in a way that will 
encourage elevators to pay quality-adjusted prices. 
In order to measure the effects of such preferences on elevator pricing, a simulation 
model is used to measure the extra profit that could be earned by an elevator that pays quality-
adjusted prices.  This profit is compared to that of its competitors, which pay an average price for 
all qualities of wheat. Prices from the elevators are evaluated by producers whose preferences are 
consistent with prospect theory. Producers choose the elevator to which they will sell their grain 




This problem is discussed first in the context of risk neutral producers, then in a 
framework in which producers maximize expected utility, and then in the context of prospect 
theory.  Following Elliott et al., country elevator A is assumed to be a profit maximizing spatial 
oligopsonist, paying a different price for each quality if it is profitable to do so.  Elevator A has 
six competitors, each located a distance U away (Figure 1).  These competitors (represented by 
elevator B) maximize profits, but pay the same price for each of three qualities of grain.  The 
elevators perform only merchandising activities, which means grain is purchased from farmers 
and sold directly to next-in-line (NIL) buyers.  It is assumed that no grain is left in storage at the 
country elevator at the end of harvest, so that quantity purchased from farmers equals quantity 















Figure 1. Spatial Competition Model (Capozza and van Order) 
 
 
 If producers maximize net revenue, the elevator’s objective can be expressed as: 
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i NIL P   =  price received from NIL buyer for quality i ($/bu) 
fi P   =  price paid to farmers by elevator for i
th quality ($/bu) 
i x   =  alternative outlet price to producer for wheat of quality i (e.g., feed value) 
vi C   =  variable costs for handling i
th quality 
i Q   =  quantity of wheat of i
th quality purchased by elevator 
i k   =  density of production of wheat of quality i in elevator’s trade area (bu/mi
2) 
i t   =  transportation cost for i
th quality ($/bu/mi) 
π   =  pi (circumference of a circle divided by the diameter) 
P
B
fi  =  price paid to farmers by competing elevators for i
th quality 
R   =  radius of elevator’s trade area  
U   =  distance between elevator and competing elevators 
and where  
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The elevator chooses the price paid to farmers for each quality of wheat.  The quantity 
received by an elevator from producers is a function of density of production in the elevator’s 
trade area, price offered to producers, competitors’ price offered to producers, and transportation 
cost.  The elevator may pay different prices for, and merchandise different quantities of, each of 
several qualities of wheat.  
The law of market areas asserts that the boundary between any two of the elevators is the 
locus of points where market price net of transportation cost for loads of wheat shipped to 
Elevator A and Elevator B are equal (Bressler and King).  This means that at the edge of an 
elevator’s trade area, transportation-adjusted price at the elevator is equal to transportation-
adjusted price at a competing elevator.  For the case where producers maximize expected utility, producers at each point in the 
production area determine whether to sell their grain to elevator A or to elevator B by evaluating 
their expected utility of selling to either elevator.  At some distance DA from elevator A, 
producers’ expected utility from selling to elevator A equals their expected utility from selling to 
elevator B.  This distance defines the boundary of each elevator’s trade area.  In turn, this 
determines the quantity of the i
th quality purchased using the formula for the area of a circle, ki π 
DA(B)i
2, where ki is the production density of wheat of quality i, DA(B)i is the radius of the trade 
area surrounding each elevator, and D is the distance between elevator A and its competitors.  
This situation can be represented mathematically as follows: 
(3) EU
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For the case where producers’ preferences are consistent with prospect theory, producers 
at each point in the production area determine whether to sell their grain to elevator A or to 
elevator B by evaluating their “prospect value” resulting from selling to either elevator.  
Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979), value is treated as a function of two arguments: the 
asset position that serves as a reference point, and the magnitude of the change (positive or 
negative) from that reference point.  They hypothesized that the value function for changes in 
wealth is normally concave above the reference point and often convex below it.  That is, the 
marginal value of both gains and losses generally decreases with their magnitude.  Also, losses 
loom larger than gains.  The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears 
to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount.  
They proposed the following value function for a set of possible outcome xi:       if                 
α
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where γ is the loss aversion coefficient.  Tversky and Kahneman (1992) have estimated α and β 
to be 0.88 and γ to be 2.25.  The above value function is (i) defined on deviations from the 
reference point; (ii) generally concave for gains and commonly convex for losses; and (iii) 
steeper for losses than for gains. 
In order to complete evaluation of an outcome, the value calculated by equation (5) 
should be combined with a decision weight, which is transformed by a weighting function.  The 
weighting function has the following properties:  1) Decision weights measure the impact of 
events on the desirability of prospects, and not merely the perceived likelihood of these events.  
2) π is an increasing function of p (the probability of the event occurring), with π(0) = 0 and π(1) 
= 1.  That is, outcomes contingent on an impossible event are ignored, and the scale is 
normalized so that π(p) is the ratio of the weight associated with the probability p to the weight 
associated with the certain event.  3) Subadditivity: π(rp) > rπ(p) where r is a constant for 0 < r 
<1.  4) Subcertainty: π(p) + π(1-p) < 1 for all 0 < p < 1.  5) Subproportionality: for a fixed ratio 
of probabilities, the ratio of the corresponding decision weights is closer to unity when the 
probabilities are low than when they are high (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
The weighting function has been developed further by Prelec (1998).  Following his 
results, the weighting function π is regressive (first  π > p, then  < p), s-shaped (first 
concave, then convex), and asymmetrical (intersection the diagonal at about 1/3). 
) (p ) (p ) (p π
For calculating π , a decision weight is assigned to outcome   using the   
approximation for w proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992),   
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= , where r is estimated at 0.61 in the domain of gains and 0.69 in the domain of losses. 
If 0.61 is used for r in the domain of gains, then the weighting function has an invariant fixed 
point and inflection point at 0.34, and if 0.69 for r in the domain of losses, then it has an 
invariant fixed point and inflection point at around 0.37.  The above approximation   for 
is also consistent with regressive (first  π > p, then π < p), and s-shaped (first concave, 
then convex) properties. 
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Finally, the overall value of a prospect can be calculated as 
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In the elevator profit maximization problem, there are two possible prospects observed by 
a producer, one from elevator A (prospect A) and one from elevator B (prospect B).  The 
producer selling wheat to elevator A faces three possible outcomes, with each outcome assigned 
a probability that depends on the proportion of wheat quality.  The producer selling wheat to 
elevator B faces only one outcome, so its probability is one.  In either case, the outcomes are the 
net prices adjusted by transportation costs and distances from each elevator.  Thus, outcomes 
applying to prospect A are   for high quality,   for middle quality, 
and   for low quality, and the outcome of prospect B is    
Define p
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h, pm, and pl as probabilities for high, middle, and low quality, then two prospects are 
represented as follows:   for prospect A and (x, 1) for prospect B.  These 
prospects will be reformulated through editing to simplify evaluation. 
) ( 3 l p x
The editing phase for these prospects is coding.  Coding is the process that transforms an 
outcome of a prospect into gains and losses relative to some neutral reference point, which is 
usually defined as the current asset position.  However, the location of the reference point, and 
the consequent coding of outcomes as gains and losses, can be affected by the expectations of the 
decision maker (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  In the elevator problem, a producer can expect that the net price paid by elevator B, which is adjusted by transportation costs, is a certain 
outcome when she decides to sell her wheat to elevator B.  Therefore, the producer’s expectation 
makes her consider the net price paid by elevator B as a reference point.  In this case, comparing 
the net prices of elevator A with the price of elevator B gives gains and losses of prospect A.  
After coding, prospect A is reformulated as   and prospect B is described 
as ( , where x
) , ; , ; , ( h h m m l l p x p x p x
) 1 , 0 l = x-x3, xm = x-x2, and xh = x-x1. 
In the evaluation phase, the reformulated prospect A is evaluated by the value function 
for outcomes (5), the weighting function (6), and the overall value function (7).  Calculating the 
prospect for producers selling to elevator B does not need this evaluation process because its 
value should be always zero.  Therefore, the decision problem of the producer is reduced to 
selling to elevator A if its prospect value is positive, and selling to elevator B if the prospect 
value from selling to elevator A is negative. 
The results from the prospect theory specification are compared to results using an 
expected utility specification as used in Adam and Hong. The analysis in an expected utility 
framework considers three levels of producer risk aversion. The Arrow-Pratt risk aversion 
parameter associated with the “medium risk aversion” level is adapted (using the procedure 
suggested by Raskin and Cochran) from literature that either elicited producers’ risk aversion 
levels or estimated the level based on production responses.  The “low” and “high” levels are 
simple adjustments of this estimated level to capture a broader range of producer risk 
preferences. 
Producer Information about Wheat Quality 
 
  For the case where producers maximize expected revenue, it is assumed that they 
know with certainty the quality of their wheat, whether high, medium, or low, as in the 
analysis by Elliott et al.  For the case where producers maximize expected utility or prospect value, however, it is assumed that they may have less than perfect information 
about the quality of their wheat.  First, an extreme case is considered in which the only 
information producers have about the quality of their wheat is the relative proportion of 
each quality of wheat grown in the elevators’ trade areas.  They have no information about 
how the quality of their wheat might differ from that of other producers in their area.  Then, 
more realistically, it is assumed that producers have more, but still incomplete, information 
about the quality of their wheat. Thus, elevators select prices knowing the proportion of 
each quality of wheat in their trade area, and producers select the elevator to which they 
will sell their wheat with prior, but incomplete, information about the quality of their 
wheat. 
For the case of more but still incomplete information, it is assumed that producers of 
high-quality wheat are 70% certain that they will deliver high-quality wheat to the elevator, 
but believe there is a 30% probability that they will in fact deliver middle-quality wheat.  
Similarly, producers of middle-quality wheat are 70% certain they will deliver middle-
quality wheat, but believe there is a 15% probability that will deliver high-quality wheat 
and a 15% probability that they will deliver low-quality wheat. Producers of low-quality 
wheat are 70% certain they will deliver low-quality wheat, but believe there is a 30% 




This section describes the procedures used to simulate elevators’ pricing decisions 
and producers’ choice of elevator to which to sell their grain. A profit-maximizing 
algorithm chooses the prices the elevator should pay producers for each quality of wheat, 
while simultaneously an expected utility maximizing algorithm chooses the optimal market (elevator A or elevator B) for producers at different locations within the elevators’ trade 
area.   
Wheat grown in an elevator’s trade area is assumed to fall into any of three quality 
categories: high, middle, and low.  Both elevator A and its competitors are assumed to have 
invested in testing equipment and additional labor in order to determine whether wheat 
delivered is high, middle, or low quality.  They keep the different qualities separate to 
receive the highest possible price from NIL buyers.  In practice, elevators may additionally 
increase profits by blending to take advantage of the discrete differences between quality 
levels.  In this model, however, since each load of grain delivered to the elevator fits 
precisely into one of the three categories, blending provides little additional benefit in most 
scenarios, and is not considered.
2   
Next-in-line (NIL) buyers are assumed to pay $5.00 for high quality wheat, $4.90 for 
middle quality wheat, and $4.80 for low quality wheat.  These are prices actually received 
by country elevators after paying transportation cost.  Production density is assumed to be 
2,174 bushels per square mile, the average production density throughout Oklahoma in 
1995.  Of this production, it is assumed that 1/3 is high quality, 1/3 is middle quality, and 
1/3 is low quality.
3   
It is assumed that producers use trucks to haul their wheat to country elevators.  
Fuller et al. used models containing linear mileage equations to determine truck cost for 
both short and long hauls.  Based on their models, the transportation cost is assumed to be 
$0.011 per bushel per mile.  It is assumed that each of the six competing elevators is 
located a distance of 40 miles from Elevator A. 
                                                            
2 Hennessey and Wahl show that the elevator’s decision on blending or segregating grain depends on the 
convexity/concavity of the price schedule from NIL buyers.  Here, the schedule is linear so that this decision can be 
ignored. 
3 Changing these assumptions within reasonable ranges does not change the results qualitatively. Elevator fixed and variable costs used are an average of the estimates by Kenkel and 
Anderson’s of grain handling cost at Oklahoma elevators, adjusted to include costs of 
grading and segregating grain.  Fixed costs include depreciation, administrative overhead, 
and interest (including amortized cost of a Carter-Day Dockage Tester) and are assumed to 
be $100,587.  Variable costs include labor, utility, chemical, and repairs.  Variable costs are 
assumed to be $0.067/bushel.  Also, it is assumed that elevators correctly segregate the 




Several steps are used to solve for producers’ and elevators’ choices.  Elevator A chooses 
profit-maximizing prices for each of the three qualities of wheat, given elevator B’s price 
(equation (1)).  For the case where producers maximize net revenue, the quantities purchased by 
the elevator and radius of the trade area are given by equation (2).  For the case where producers 
maximize expected utility (prospect value), a nonlinear constraint is included in which the 
distance to the boundary of the trade area between elevators A and B is such that, at the 
boundary, the expected utility (prospect value) of producers is the same for selling to elevator A 
as it is for selling to elevator B for each quality of wheat. From this constraint, quantities 
purchased by the elevators and the radii are calculated.  
This problem is solved with the objective that the equilibrium solution satisfy the Nash 
criterion, that each player’s strategy is a best response to the strategies actually played by its 
rivals.  Thus, elevator B chooses its profit maximizing price for the three qualities, given elevator 
A’s prices, and trade areas and quantities are recalculated for each elevator.  Then the process is 
repeated, with elevator A choosing prices, given B’s prices, and so on, until elevator A’s and 
elevator B’s prices stabilize. GAUSS, along with its optimization and constrained optimization 
modules, is used to solve the simulations (Aptech Systems).  
Results 
  
Producers Maximize Expected Net Revenue 
 
For the case where producers maximize net revenue (table 1), elevators pass on to 
producers 70% of the price differentials received from next-in-line buyers, so that they receive a 
margin of 32¢/bu. for high quality, 29¢/bu. for middle quality, and 26¢/bu. for low quality wheat.  
Quantities received and trade area radius vary directly with their prices.  Elevator B pays an 
average price for all qualities that is just lower than elevator A’s price for middle quality wheat. 
  The trade area boundary for high quality wheat is 23.35 miles from elevator A, or 3.35 
miles beyond the midpoint between the elevators.  For middle quality wheat the boundary is just 
0.32 miles beyond the midpoint, and for low quality wheat, is 2.71 miles less than the midpoint.  
These radii are consistent with the prices paid and quantities received: higher prices relative to 
elevator B’s prices result in a larger trade area and high quantities received.  By pricing 
according to quality, elevator A achieves a profit of $557,851, about 20% higher than elevator 
B’s profit. 
Producers Maximize Expected Utility 
  For the case where producers maximize expected utility and have no information about 
the quality of their crop (Tables 2 and 3), the probability a producer will deliver a particular 
quality of wheat is equal to its proportion of total production in the trade area.  In this simulation, 
producers have a 1/3 chance that their wheat will grade high quality, 1/3 that it will grade middle 
quality, and 1/3 that it will grade low quality.  Because they don’t know the quality of their 
wheat, producers select an elevator that will pay the highest risk-adjusted price for an evenly-
weighted portfolio of all the possible qualities.  As tables 2 and 3 indicate, this implies that 
elevators have little incentive to pay quality-adjusted prices, since risk averse producers prefer a 
certain average price than a random price with an expected value equal to the average price.  In table 2, Elevator A pays prices that reflect 30% of the price differences paid by NIL buyers by 
setting those prices high enough so that the average of the three prices is $4.613/bu, which is 
$0.013/bu higher than Elevator B’s price.  This results in margins of $0.35/bu. for high quality 
wheat, $0.28/bu. for middle quality wheat, and $0.23/bu. for low quality wheat.  The radius of 
elevator A’s trade area is slightly bigger than elevator B’s (20.02 miles compared to 19.98 
miles), and its profits are 3/10 of a percent higher than elevator B’s profits. 
As table 3 indicates, for producers that are more risk averse, elevator A optimizes profits 
by paying nearly the same price for all three qualities.  Its profits are only 2/100 of a percent 
higher than elevator B’s profits.  Because of producers’ risk aversion, elevator A does not find it 
profitable to pay quality-adjusted prices.  These results indicate the risk aversion is very 
important when producers have no information about the quality of their wheat compared to the 
overall quality of wheat in their region.   
Results for the case where producers have additional, but still incomplete, information 
about the quality of their wheat indicate that elevators pay nearly the same high price for high- 
and middle quality wheat and a much lower price for low quality wheat (tables 5 through 7).  
Thus, the prices for high- and middle quality wheat are higher than those paid by Elevator B, and 
the price for low quality wheat is lower than Elevator B’s price.  Profits at each elevator decline 
by slightly more than 1/10 of one percent, compared to the expected revenue case.  Increasing 
producers’ level of risk aversion changes those results very little, except that elevator A’s profits 
are very slightly reduced and elevator B’s profits are slightly enhanced as level of risk aversion 
increases.   
Producers Maximize Prospect Value 
Table 8 indicates than when producers’ preferences can be characterized by prospect 
theory, Elevator A’s prices differ across qualities by $0.05/bu. compared to the risk neutral case in which there was a difference of $0.07/bu.  Thus, prospect theory helps explain part of country 
elevators’ reluctance to pass premiums and discounts on to producers. 
Comparing Table 8 with the expected utility results when producers have “some 
information” (Tables 5-7) shows that the prices seem to be more related to quality differences 
than prices under expected utility.  However, Elevator A achieves only a 1.5% profit advantage 
over Elevator B by paying quality-adjusted prices, whereas under the expected utility 
specification, the advantage from paying quality-adjusted prices is approximately 20%. Thus, if 
producers’ preferences can be characterized more appropriately by prospect theory than by 
expected utility, elevators face a much smaller potential gain from paying quality-adjusted 
prices. This provides a better, though still partial, explanation of why more elevators do not 




  A cursory review of the results suggests that prospect theory does not provide any 
advantage over expected utility theory to explain why elevators do not pay quality-adjusted 
prices.  The optimal price structure for a profit-maximizing elevator is to pass on to producers 
roughly half of the premiums/discounts it receives from NIL buyers.  Presumably, an elevator 
would choose to do this, and its competitors would be forced to follow.  As Elliott et al. showed, 
if this happened, elevators would pass on all quality-based premiums/discounts to producers. 
Further review of the prospect theory results, though, suggests that an elevator’s potential 
profit gain from paying quality-adjusted prices is relatively small, representing only a 1.5% 
advantage over its competitors that do not pay quality-adjusted prices.  If other factors, such as 
producer loyalty, are important to the elevator’s management, this potential gain may be too 
small to risk losing that loyalty.   Further research should examine the effects of alternative levels of information producers 
have about the quality of their wheat in a prospect theory context.  Adam and Hong found in an 
expected utility framework, and the current results are consistent with their findings, that the 
level of information producers have has a bigger effect on elevators’ incentive to pay quality-
adjusted prices than level of risk aversion does.  Also, the incentive by elevator managers to 
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Elevator A       
Pf1 = $4.68    Q1 =    1,241K  Radius1 = 23.35   
Pf2 = $4.61    Q2 =       940K  Radius2 = 20.32  $557,851 
Pf3 = $4.54    Q3 =       681K  Radius3 = 17.29   
 
Elevator B  
      
Pf1 = $4.60    Q1 =        631K  Radius1 = 16.65    
Pf2 = $4.60    Q2 =        882K  Radius2 = 19.68  $464,605 




Table 2. Producers maximize expected utility but don’t know crop quality (AP = 0.00176): 









Elevator A         
Pf1 = $4.68    Q1 =     911,452  Radius1 = 20.01   
Pf2 = $4.62    Q2 =     911,452  Radius2 = 20.01  $500,370 
Pf3 = $4.54    Q3 =     911,452  Radius3 = 20.01   
 
Elevator B 
      
Pf1 = $4.61    Q1 =     909,834  Radius1 = 19.99    
Pf2 = $4.61    Q2 =     909,834  Radius2 = 19.99  $500,000 




Table 3. Producers maximize expected utility but don’t know crop quality (AP = 0.088): 









Elevator A         
Pf1 = $4.62    Q1 =     910,763  Radius1 = 20.00   
Pf2 = $4.61    Q2 =     910,763  Radius2 = 20.00  $500,389 
Pf3 = $4.61    Q3 =     910,763  Radius3 = 20.00   
 
Elevator B 
      
Pf1 = $4.61    Q1 =     910,523  Radius1 = 20.00   
Pf2 = $4.61    Q2 =     910,523  Radius2 = 20.00  $500,328 
Pf3 = $4.61    Q3 =     910,523  Radius3 = 20.00  (Diff = $61) 
 Table 4. Producers maximize expected utility but don’t know crop quality (AP = 0.264): 









Elevator  A       
Pf1 = $4.61    Q1 =    910,724  Radius1 = 20.00   
Pf2 = $4.61    Q2 =    910,724  Radius2 = 20.00  $500,415 
Pf3 = $4.61    Q3 =    910,724  Radius3 = 20.00   
 
Elevator B  
     
Pf1 = $4.61    Q1 =    910,562  Radius1 = 20.00    
Pf2 = $4.61    Q2 =    910,562  Radius2 = 20.00  $500,373 
Pf3 = $4.61     Q3 =    910,562  Radius3 = 20.00  (Diff = $42) 
    
 
Table 5. Producers maximize expected utility and have some information about crop 









Elevator A         
Pf1 = $4.66    Q1 =    1,137K  Radius1 = 22.35   
Pf2 = $4.66    Q2 =    1,022K  Radius2 = 21.30  $551,006 
Pf3 = $4.51    Q3 =       696K  Radius3 = 17.48   
 
Elevator B  
      
Pf1 = $4.61    Q1 =       709K  Radius1 = 17.65    
Pf2 = $4.61    Q2 =       796K  Radius2 = 18.70  $457,304 




Table 6. Producers maximize expected utility and have some information about crop 









Elevator A         
Pf1 = $4.66    Q1 =    1,137K  Radius1 = 22.35   
Pf2 = $4.66    Q2 =    1,022K  Radius2 = 21.30  $551,009 
Pf3 = $4.51    Q3 =       696K  Radius3 = 17.48   
 
Elevator B  
      
Pf1 = $4.61    Q1 =       709K  Radius1 = 17.65   
Pf2 = $4.61    Q2 =       796K  Radius2 = 18.70  $457,513 
Pf3 = $4.61    Q3 =    1,154K  Radius3 = 22.52  (Diff = 
$93,496) 
 
 Table 7. Producers maximize expected utility and have some information about crop 









Elevator A         
Pf1 = $4.66    Q1 =   1,138K  Radius1 = 22.31   
Pf2 = $4.66    Q2 =   1,031K  Radius2 = 21.28  $550,069 
Pf3 = $4.51    Q3 =     699K  Radius3 = 17.52   
 
Elevator B  
      
Pf1 = $4.61    Q1 =     712K  Radius1 = 17.69    
Pf2 = $4.61    Q2 =     798K  Radius2 = 18.72  $458,069 




Table 8. Producers maximize expected utility and have more information about crop 
quality (AP = 0.00176): PNIL1=$5.00, PNIL2=$4.90, PNIL3=$4.80 
      Trade Area Radius  Elevator 
Quality  Price ($/bu)  Quantity (bu)  (miles)  Profit ($) 
Elevator A         
High 4.67 1,169K  22.66   
Middle 4.63  998K  20.94  $550,372 
Low 4.54  680K  17.28   
        
Elevator B         
High 4.60  685K  17.34   
Middle 4.60  827K  19.06  $465,180 
Low 4.60 1,175K  22.72  (Diff  = 
$85,192) 
 
     
 
Table 9. Producers maximize expected utility and have more information about crop 
quality (AP = 0.088): PNIL1=$5.00, PNIL2=$4.90, PNIL3=$4.80 
      Trade Area Radius  Elevator 
Quality  Price ($/bu)  Quantity (bu)  (miles)  Profit ($) 
Elevator A         
High 4.67 1,169K  22.65   
Middle 4.63  997K  20.93  $549,825 
Low 4.54  681K  17.29   
        
Elevator B         
High 4.60  685K  17.35   
Middle 4.60  828K  19.07  $464,955 
Low 4.60 1,174K  22.71  (Diff  = 
$84,870) 
  
Table 10. Producers maximize expected utility and have more information about crop 
quality (AP = 0.264): PNIL1=$5.00, PNIL2=$4.90, PNIL3=$4.80 
      Trade Area Radius  Elevator 
Quality  Price ($/bu)  Quantity (bu)  (miles)  Profit ($) 
Elevator A         
High 4.67  1,167,122  22.64   
Middle 4.63 996,106 20.92  $549,760 
Low 4.54  681,803  17.31   
        
Elevator B         
High 4.60  685,945  17.36   
Middle 4.60 829,012 19.08  $465,130 





Table 11. Producers maximize prospect value and have some information about crop 
quality: PNIL1=$5.00, PNIL2=$4.90, PNIL3=$4.80 (B’s prices used as reference points) 
      Trade Area Radius  Elevator 
Quality  Price ($/bu)  Quantity (bu)  (miles)  Profit ($) 
Elevator A         
High 4.65  1,085,859  21.84   
Middle 4.60 874,914 19.60  $534,081 
Low 4.55  683,505  17.33   
        
Elevator B         
High 4.60  750,834  18.16   
Middle 4.60 947,087 20.40  $525,763 


















Figure 1. Spatial Competition Model (Capozza and van Order, 1978) 
 